Poor Timing for Taiwan's KMT Party Problems

Taiwan’s general elections are planned for 16 January 2016, however their outcome has been obvious for some time. While the new president as well as makeup of the Legislative Yuan will surprise few, the elections may have profound implications for regional security and cross-Strait relations.

The game was set long before this began. A reversal of the actual Kuomintang’s (KMT) domination of the Legislative Yuan is very likely. Hurt through internal strife, the well-being of the ruling KMT is low. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen leads the campaign by a huge margin. The emergence of multiple, little pan-blue affiliated parties threaten to further split votes for the KMT. Because the pro-independence DPP appears set to return to energy, the risk of more turbulent cross-Strait relations is increasing.

Serious internal divisions plague the KMT, especially between Leader Ma Ying-jeou and the Speaker from the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng. Due to such divisive party factionalism, few potential presidential candidates could have made it through the KMT’s presidential main process. Even worse, a number of KMT incumbent Legislative Yuan members decided to drop out of the elections, leaving the party shakier than ever.

The deputy speaker of the legislature, Strung Hsiu-chu surprisingly went through the primary alone and obtained the party’utes nomination for presidential bid. However, Hung’s policies were considered as well close to Beijing’s and endangered to damage the KMT’s possibility of winning a majority in the legislature. Consequently, KMT leaders replaced her along with party chairman Chu Li-luan in October 2015.

The KMT has already lost majority control of the municipalities and areas, following a major defeat within the nine-in-one elections held on 29 The fall of 2014. However, the party’s frontrunners have failed to reform and the Ma–Wang strife caused repeated political blunders throughout 2015. Despite an outstanding performance during the first public debate, Chu has not been able to incorporate the competing factions within the KMT. Neither could he manage to turn around the plummeting popularity of the incumbent government just three months before the general elections. In addition, Taiwan’s younger generation is not keen on the conservative KMT.

A large KMT majority has traditionally dominated Taiwan’s political landscape. However, analysts speculate that the KMT will hardly hold onto minimum levels of support. Since the beginning of the race, Tsai has consistently led her competitors by more than 20 percent within polls. A landslide victory would give the DPP a unified federal government, and a chance to redirect Taiwan’utes political structure and democratic long term.

Tsai has not yet clearly articulated numerous key policies, including exactly how she will manage the crucial relationship with mainland China. However support for her remains high. It seems that the DPP is not likely in order to win because of their promising guidelines, but because the KMT is crumbling.

Many Taiwanese support Tsai’s more circumspect mindset towards mainland China, despite the fact that her exact position upon cross-Strait relation remains very ambiguous. Tsai has publicly rejected the ‘1992 Consensus’, supported by the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, yet she has committed to ‘maintaining the status quo’, despite not having elaborated on what what this means is.

Along the campaign trail, the actual DPP’s position on the ocean going territorial disputes in the South China Sea has also been questioned. Even though Tsai has failed to detail her policy on this issue too, many believe that she will try to cruise through this dangerous coverage zone and maintain Taiwan’s existing policies.

Strategically, it is understandable which Tsai feels that there is no immediate need to clarify her foreign policy as long as she is top the polls. Maintaining some political ambiguity is critical for Tsai, as she has to accommodate different political forces within her party, especially hardline pro-independence supporters.

However, it might be a serious challenge to Beijing if Tsai does reject the actual ‘1992 Consensus’ after taking over the federal government as expected in May 2016. During the last eight years, this unclear agreement on the One The far east policy has served as a magic formula for facilitating good ties between China as well as Taiwan. It would be difficult to continue present courses of communication if Tsai does not recognise the consensus.

Chinese President Xi Jinping seems to realise the difficulties of engaging with a DPP government in Taiwan and has pushed to examine current approaches to Taiwan. Xi took the brave move in holding the summit with President Mum on 7 November 2015 in the hopes of laying the groundwork for the future of cross-Strait relations. Of course, when push comes to push, Beijing is well prepared on all fronts to cope with the actual DPP.

DPP’s foreign policy approach emphasises deeper relations with the Usa and Japan, rather than landmass China. However, pursuing this method to cross-Strait relations will be a large challenge for the DPP government. The actual political reality is that Taiwan doesn’t have much leverage in its relationships with China or with other key players in the region. Regardless of the DPP’s less accommodating coverage inclinations, pragmatic considerations will likely pressure the DPP and Beijing to build reliable channels for conversation immediately after the election.

Crumbling KMT opens the door for DPP government is republished along with permission from East Asian countries Forum