Indonesian Diplomacy Uses ASEAN to Gain Some Leverage

Since President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office, he has been clear and constant in explaining his international policy priorities, enunciating the principle of putting ‘national interest’ first. Putting national interest first isn’t surprising in a leader’s foreign coverage. What has been notable is the way that Jokowi has defined ‘national interest’. Put simply, Indonesia’s policy has shifted from one based on values to one based on economics.

Jokowi’utes first speech on international affairs signalled the change in strategy, at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit within November 2014. While agreeing upon ASEAN’s importance, he stressed that ‘We have to make sure the national interest cannot be lost’. He restated the principle before visiting Singapore in July 2015, saying that ‘national interests would be the motivation for cooperation with other countries’.

This is a significant policy shift compared to his predecessor, former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY). Indonesia’s technique under SBY was to raise its international status by upholding values such as human legal rights and democracy, and by playing an energetic part in global government through institutions like the United Nations (UN). ASEAN was seen as a way of achieving greater leverage for Indonesia’s diplomacy. The economic aspect of national interest was very fragile in 2005.

In 2004–2005, when SBY began his first phrase, the Bush administration’s battle against terrorism was at its peak. The Bali bombings and Jemaah Islamiah’s activities showed that Indonesia also had a security problem. Along with security concerns dominating worldwide politics, preventing foreign politics or military intervention what food was in the top of Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda. Its strategy was to emphasise that it hadn’t been a country of extremists, but the nation of moderate as well as modern Muslims, and a successful democracy.

This had been why SBY projected its image in terms of values rather than the economic climate. In contrast, Jokowi came to office throughout a major economic power shift. He had to project a picture of Indonesia as a cautious economic player that would not really easily fall behind.

Three elements stand out when we examine the new foreign policy.

First is the Indonesian people’s frustration in the final years of the SBY administration. Unfortunately, towards the end of his presidency, SBY’s ‘million friends and zero enemies’ policy sounded more like an excuse to prevent taking responsibility to advance domestic demands than anything else.

Jokowi and the team were aware of these frustrations. It appeared the new president’s plan to overcome the shortcomings of his predecessor’s platform was to reveal the diplomatic dividend with the individuals. The easiest way to do that would be by sharing the economic benefits of trade, investment and employment.

The restrictions of value-based or ‘democracy’ diplomacy has been the second key factor in changing international policy. One milestone associated with SBY’s diplomacy was establishing the actual ASEAN Charter. This not only institutionalised the association and raised its trustworthiness but, with strong inspiration from Indonesia, ASEAN also embraced the idea of shared political ideals: human rights and democracy. Winning agreement from the politically diverse regular membership was a significant achievement.

Shared-value diplomacy additionally had a strategic purpose, for this was designed to create greater international leverage both by improving ASEAN’s strategic value and increasing Indonesia’s global status as the de facto leader.

However, the limits of value-based diplomacy became clear following the coup in Thailand in Might 2014, after the ASEAN charter had taken effect. As the charter prohibits buying of power by extra-constitutional indicates, the coup violated it’s principles.

SBY and then foreign reverend Marty Natalegawa demanded that Myanmar, the 2014 ASEAN chair, issue a statement criticising or indicating serious regret about the occasions in Thailand. However, unsurprisingly, Myanmar had been quick to acknowledge the Thai junta and the importance of the military’s need to intervene at times. Cambodia followed suit, acknowledging the actual junta because the monarchy endorsed it, the common source of legitimacy between the two countries.

Failure to condemn the Thai hen house weakened the charter as well as Indonesia’s diplomatic influence in making it. It showed the bounds of what Indonesia, despite to be the group’s de-facto leader, could hope to achieve through its diplomacy in ASEAN and through value-based diplomacy.

Third, the shift in the direction of a greater economic focus fits within the current administration’s broader views on global dynamics along with a shift in economic power to the actual East. As Jokowi’s thought of the regional and global order is fundamentally moored in economics, it was organic for him to see Indonesia’s national interest in the same terms. The aim is to ensure that Indonesia’s economy is in the winner’s circle as global dynamics alter. Looking forward, there is no hint which Jokowi’s foreign policy and it is economic focus will change.

Optimists and pessimists alike will agree this focus is good for Indonesia’s potential customers. Optimists consider that, with Indonesia’s demographic bonus, there is great potential for it to be the next Asian development engine. Emphasis on economic nationwide interest will therefore promise a gain in Indonesia’s worldwide political power. Pessimists will see Asia’s growth slowing and protectionism establishing. In this scenario, the government might gain credit for trying to secure Indonesia’s economic curiosity by crafting a friendly local and global environment.

The economic turn in foreign policy is more structural than based on management. Given how similar Jokowi as well as Prabowo Subianto’s comments were within pre-election debates on foreign policy, it seems likely that even when Prabowo had won the presidential political election, he would have defined ‘national interest’ in similar terms. Domestic economic benefits will continue to be electorally popular and critical in Indonesia as well as define what is and isn’t in the national interest. Consequently, it will continue to drive Indonesia’utes foreign policy — at least before the next turn.

Indonesia’s international policy takes an economic turn is republished with permission through East Asia Forum