How to Move 10 Million People

According to the central Chinese federal government, solving rural poverty and environmental degradation problems will need resettling more than 10 million citizens by 2050. This number does not range from the 7 million people that have already been resettled over the last 30 years or so. The huge scale of these population resettlement applications was confirmed by Leader Xi Jinping during his recent visits to some of the provinces most concerned, where he called upon regional Party and state authorities to ‘implement with full force’ the environmental resettlement tasks in order to ‘uphold both environmental and development standards’.

In China, environmental resettlement means resettling entire communities residing in areas deemed unable to support sustainable livelihoods due to harsh environmental conditions. Ostensibly, resettlement serves the twin purpose of protecting the environment – through forbidding grazing and logging, reducing population pressure and land use – and helping local neighborhoods to break away from the cycle of rural poverty. Over the past few decades, these resettlement projects have been extremely publicised and are said to be an integral part of China’s ‘sustainable development strategy’.

Less well known are the negative consequences associated with these resettlement projects, which reveal vulnerable migrants to severe perils of social isolation, economic exclusion and material impoverishment.

A review of ecological resettlement programs over the last the 3 decades in China shows that focal points of the state apparatus have consistently trumped those of the towns to be resettled. In other countries, the guaranteed beneficial results of resettlement programs function not materialise and authorities are generally very reluctant to fully involve local communities in the process of their own resettlement. This seems particularly true in China, where resettlement projects seem to put migrants in a situation of chronic impoverishment and better vulnerability.

Data collected among environmental migrants from the province of Ningxia reveal that most suffered a sharp reduction in terms of housing size and a substantial increase in living expenses. Furthermore, access to basic social services, like healthcare and training, are not consistently enforced.

Resettlement outcomes also in severe consequences that are not easily quantified but are still seriously disturbing for migrants. Even a long time after resettlement, ethnic Mongolian migrants in Internal Mongolia say their new neighborhood remains nothing but an ‘vacant frame’, leaving them with a deep feeling of confusion, loss of control and longing for their traditional lifestyle. Migrants often end up just as, if not more, vulnerable in their place of resettlement than in their own original habitat.

As for the environment, these large-scale resettlement policies have in the past resulted in a lose-lose scenario, where the root environmental problems had been far from being resolved by the resettlement of local communities. Although initially intended to protect and restore areas plagued by serious destruction, they have not always led to any kind of sustainable improvements. Some resettlement projects have even resulted in the development of industrial livestock production within areas previously untouched through intensive animal farming. These types of have had even more dire effects on the environment than the conventional activities of resettled herders and farmers.

In view of these negative consequences, using alibis of environmental preservation and human development to justify population resettlement policies appears inappropriate, if not outright dishonest. The issue of how traditional livelihoods of rural communities and environmental degradation interact is complex, and thus far, the answers supplied by policymakers in the form of population resettlement failed to solve any of China’s ecological or poverty problems.

While the present Chinese leadership seems determined to pursue and even accelerate these types of policies, it is not being kept adequately accountable for past failed experiences. Sadly, public discussion on these policies within China is severely restricted. Scholars in China may tolerate criticism of these guidelines poorly despite numerous field surveys suggesting the harmful results of the resettlement projects.

Other solutions — far less risky and troublesome for local communities — are also available. The example of organised Tibetan communities in Qinghai, among others, shows us the advantages of a true local ownership of ecological conservation projects. A vital to empowering local communities is actually ‘to work at the pace of the community, not at the pace of external parties’. These experiences of involving local population within the protection of their habitat (rather than resettling them) have made compelling instances that resettlement is far from the only solution available.

Whether these alternative solutions to resettlement can be implemented is dependent largely on the willingness of policymakers. For these solutions to be adopted, leadership must not only be aware of the existence of these alternative models but also have the will and the ability to adopt a flexible and participatory approach in the implementation of policies.

Population resettlement in The far east a lose-lose scenario is republished along with permission from East Asian countries Forum