Could the Ukraine Crisis Benefit China?

The impact of the Ukraine crisis around the geopolitical order in Europe as well as beyond is clear. Although The far east is not directly involved, many Western observers believe that it is the biggest winner from the crisis. The argument is that Western sanctions mean Russia will transfer closer to China while the Usa has to shift its interest back to Europe, thus moderating it’s rebalancing efforts to counter the rising China. Ultimately, the argument goes, this creates a new strategic opportunity for Beijing.

Analysts like John Mearsheimer who hold this view tend to focus on signs of closer Sino–Russian relations. A 30-year gas deal, hands deals, joint naval exercises within the Mediterranean, a currency exchange agreement, complimentary stances on proper issues and a propensity to supply each other political support before Western critics all seem to point in that direction. These analysts then conclude that a ‘soft’ Sino–Russian alliance is coming to concentrate on the United States intentionally.

These arguments are flawed. There is still proper distrust between the two powers. Additionally, China has refused in order to compromise on its principles of non-interference and sovereignty by supporting Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Yet a more fundamental mistake is that these analysts underestimate the China–Ukraine relationship. It is problematic to say China as well as Russia are moving nearer due to the crisis if Beijing has not altered its co-operation with Kiev. While China–Ukraine relations appeared frozen at the height from the crises, they have now started to warm up with increasing indications of exchange and cooperation within economics, trade and other proper areas.

Between March and May 2015, officials from Ukraine and China authorized off on a loan-for-grain deal really worth US$3 billion and a bilateral currency exchange worth around US$2.4 billion. In the first half of 2015, Ukraine changed the United States as China’s leading corn exporter. There has also been discussion about possibly co-producing a series of new Ukrainian army aircraft in China.

Some wonder if Beijing abandoned Kiev. The Ukraine turmoil did put Beijing inside a dilemma: both Russia and Ukraine are its strategic companions. Some observers assume that the rational choice was to remain with Moscow, but this underestimates the importance of Ukraine within Beijing’s calculations. Apart from shared economic interests, Ukraine is more prepared to sell advanced weapons as well as share sensitive technology with China than Russia.

Abandoning Ukraine might never be an option for The far east, although a short period of stagnation can be done. While Beijing is usually active in evacuating its civilians through restive situations, that did not happen in Ukraine. Chinese language investors, most of which are state-owned enterprises, remained.

After years of social as well as political instability, Kiev needs trade and investment to rebuild its national economy as well as China is ready to export facilities development projects under the One Belt, One Road initiative. Senior diplomats from both nations have expressed their readiness to cooperate under the effort. All this indicates that China as well as Ukraine are ready to restore and enhance their bilateral relations.

Many observers also argue that China sided with Russia in the Crimean crisis. They then raise the possibility that Russia may support China’s sovereignty claims within the East China Sea as well as South China Sea in return. However, this is questionable.

Russia definitely has more strategic importance than Ukraine in Beijing’s eyes, yet Beijing is not prepared to change its non-interference principle with regard to Russia. In a joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations within 1992 and again in subsequent statements, China obviously recognised Crimea as under Ukraine’utes sovereignty. Backing down from this position would hurt China’s trustworthiness and antagonise the West.

There are multiple reasons why Beijing supports Moscow beyond Ukraine. Both China and Russia face Western criticisms for their domestic politics and human legal rights record, and both begin to see the United States as the top possible security threat. Due to a insufficient legitimacy from democratic elections or a broadly accepted ideology, Chinese frontrunners are sensitive to real or even imaged external threats, which generates strong incentives to help a remote Russia.

Sino–Russian cooperation following the crisis is asymmetric. Simply put, Russia needs China a lot more than China needs Russia. Putin has paid exorbitantly to please Beijing. In addition to the gas deal, Moscow has given key infrastructure projects to Chinese investors and agreed ‘in principle’ to sell Beijing some of its most advanced weapons. Putin’s offer can only create a temporary boom in Sino–Russian relations. Meanwhile seeds of distrust and resentment are taking root within the Kremlin due to Beijing’s refusal to confess Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea and indecisiveness on other key problems.

In addition, just as China continues to be ambiguous on Crimea, Russia is unlikely to take sides in China’utes maritime disputes. Russia has long served as the most important partner of India and Vietnam within national defence. Chinese frontrunners must remember that during the China–Indian border disputes in the Nineteen fifties, the Soviet Union stood along with India, which contributed to the actual collapse of the Sino–Soviet connections. In the 1980s, Vietnam, backed through the Soviets, threated China’s border security from the south.

Moreover, while Russia has disputes with Japan over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, it probably will not go as far as to antagonise Tokyo. In the long term, the Kremlin will develop its economic interests with Tokyo to avoid economic overreliance on China. It is possible that Beijing sees Russia’s involvement in East Oriental security as unhelpful and detrimental, considering that, it raises uncertainty and closer ties with Russia exacerbate Western accusations of China’s strategic motives.

Some argue that the Ukraine crisis signals a closer Sino–Russian strategic relationship, which could potentially undermine the United States’ position. However, China–Ukraine relations are actually warming up and they will probably continue to do so. With this in mind, it’s inaccurate to say China sides with Moscow or is the biggest winner from the Ukraine crisis.

Why the West is actually wrong about Beijing as well as Kiev is republished with permission from East Asia Forum