China Presses Vietnam with Oilrig Redeployment

The redeployment of a Chinese oilrig in the South China Sea (SCS) shows an inconsistency in the rhetoric and practice associated with China’s policy in the disputed waters. Together with its mass land reclamation activities, these measures are part and parcel of coercive diplomacy. It affirms China’s territorial ambition within the highly strategic sea. However is it likely to escalate into regional conflict?

Chinese Haiyang Shiyou oil rig 981, 320 kilometers southeast of Hong Kong in the South China Ocean, 7 May, 2012. Upon July 16, 2014, China moved an oilrig that it had used in a section of the South China Sea, triggering a dispute with Vietnam. (Photo: AAP)

China’s Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HD-981) oilrig had been redeployed in June after the 2014 dispute with Vietnam. This time, the rig returned at a crucial second: just weeks before the very first visit by the General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong to Washington. With a rapprochement that is leading towards a US–Vietnam comprehensive relationship, the meeting’s agenda also includes South China Sea issues, to China’s annoyance.

The transfer itself, announced by China’s maritime safety authorities, also comes soon after the country pointed out it was close to completion of its land reclamation activities in the maritime heart of Southeast Asian countries. Owned by the China National Offshore Oil Cooperation, the rig will officially operate from 26 June to twenty August 2015.

While the oilrig’s existing location is not as close to Vietnam because it was in 2014, China’s intent is clear to be achieving tactical dominance in what it deems its own waters. Moreover, control over el born area with nearby nuclear-armed submarines in Hainan Island destinations secures China’s second-strike capability to counter-top any hypothetical US nuclear strike.

Yet it is unlikely that Vietnam will overreact to this provocation. They have no instant reason to do so and are accustomed to Chinese displays of energy. It would be prudent to continue the actual approach of carefully managing and engaging China, as well as forces that are more distant. There was no press release from the Vietnamese spokesman after the incident. Vietnam’s muted response to the redeployment of the rig should be interpreted in the light of General Secretary Trong’s current statement: ‘China is a big neighbor. Therefore, whether we like it or not, we still have to reside close to that country. All of us don’t have the right to select a neighbour’.

China’s rhetoric regarding SCS policy walks a thin line between ‘indisputable sovereignty rights’ — regarding the 9-dash-line map that’s currently printed in all new Chinese passports — and China being a responsible regional power. China has even gone so far as to hint at extending an open invitation to other regional states to use reclamation facilities, which include lighthouses, wireless navigation and conversation, emergency rescue stations, and scientific research centres.

China is likely to continue to claim that those produced military facilities are naturally for defensive purposes rather than for employing its unpleasant advantage. But in reality, China’s practice in the SCS contradicts its unsupported claims. Satellite images show the unprecedented speed, scale as well as intensity of, the most crucial aspect of which is the 3.5 kilometre driveway suitable for combat aircrafts. It’s calculated that the total area reclaimed jumped from Five acres in January 2014 to 500 acres in The month of january 2015. By June 2015, China had reclaimed 2000 acres, more than all the land reclaimed by all other countries in the SCS combined.

This differs from other reclamation activities in the region since it is reportedly coupled with heavy weaponry stationed onto the artificial islands. China has also been using drinking water cannons to attack other claimants’ fishing boats. These actions violate the UN’s prohibition of the threat or use of force. They can hardly been described as ‘self-restraint’, which had been agreed to in the non-binding 2002 Declaration on the Carry out of Parties in the SCS.

However, Beijing’s move may prove detrimental to its larger foreign coverage interests, specifically the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. This particular grand strategy focuses on infrastructure connectivity and economic co-operation among China and Eurasian and Asian countries, including ASEAN, as well as some African countries.

The SCS dispute has already dominated the latest ASEAN summit and the subsequent official statement. Ultimately, escalating tension will only additional unite ASEAN on matters within the SCS, a topic on which consensus exists within the Association, however fragile or contested it might be.

China is also still surrounded by a network of countries with ‘hub-and-spoke’ military cooperation with the United States: Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore and Australia. With the Obama administration ending, the United States could enhance its policy of ‘pivoting’ to Asia, which stipulates the maintenance of regional stability as well as freedom of navigation.

As The far east is one of the biggest beneficiaries of a status quo in the SCS, for The far east: both the costs and perils of the latter are too high with regard to Beijing. A clearer, practical and well-articulated foreign policy will be a conduit to a leading role for China on the international maritime chessboard. As global energy configuration shifts and evolves, small state as if Vietnam will lead a balanced yet impartial foreign and security. Continuing to move forward, gradualism is still the best approach for this challenge resolution.

With China’s oilrig back in the Southern China Sea, what is Vietnam’s play? is republished with permission from East Asia Forum