Can the Next Indonesian Election Achieve Lofty Goals?
On 9 December, Indonesia will have its first simultaneous local executive elections to elect governors, area heads and mayors in 269 localities (out of 537) across Indonesia. Whilst direct election of local executives has been held since 2004, this is the first time these elections will be held simultaneously on a single day.
This change was implemented in the new Local Government Elections Legislation enacted in March 2015. The nation’s Elections Commission (KPU), which is tasked with administering national and local-level elections in Indonesia, supports the legislation, arguing that it’s cheaper, more efficient and more useful. Local elections under the previous electoral routine are considered expensive and susceptible to ‘vote buying’ and other forms of electoral irregularities.
But the scheduled simultaneous elections tend to be unlikely to meet any of the above objectives. To begin with, while local government authorities are mandated to allocate 7 trillion Rupiahs (US$495.4 million) to cover election-related expenses in their particular localities, actual election costs could be much higher. Some districts have reported that total expenses have doubled, and perhaps even tripled.
According to a report by the State Auditing Agency (BPK), this might be because of the lack of ‘adequate human resources as well as administrative guidelines’, which encourages overspending through candidates and local bureaucrats. Thus, the actual KPU’s goal of reducing the price of local elections is unlikely to be met just by holding them simultaneously.
Another reason behind the high costs of operating local executive elections in Indonesia is the increasing prevalence associated with ‘money politics’. Candidates often have to supply payments to party authorities (to be officially nominated through their parties), their campaign team members and increasingly to potential voters as well.
My study throughout the 2014 election indicates that local legal candidates paid each potential voter between 50,000 in order to 60,000 rupiahs (US$ 3.Fifty to US$4.20). Surveyed voters established that they were more likely to vote for the actual candidate that was willing to give them the most money. With ‘money politics’ now seemingly institutionalised in both national and local elections, numerous local executive applicants can be expected to engage in such methods during this December’s elections.
Rigid nomination requirements with regard to local executive candidates, and also the increasing personalisation of local executive elections, also mean that merely a small number of potential candidates with broad name recognition as well as substantial campaign finances genuinely have a chance. Candidates can only end up being legally nominated by politics parties that hold at least 20 percent of seats in the local parliament (DPRD), or won 25 percent of legitimate votes cast in the previous nearby elections. This means that the only candidates apt to be nominated are those who can form a broad coalition with parties which are represented in the DPRD.
Often, successful nominees are incumbent governors, district heads as well as mayors. They have all the advantages their incumbent status can provide, ranging from popular name recognition and the ability to channel government sources to the constituencies crucial for their electoral achievements. As a result, a number of popular incumbents, for example Mayor Tri Rismaharini from Surabaya, will be re-elected without any real opposition.
A developing number of candidates are the spouses, children or other relatives of previous incumbents, taking advantage of their popular name recognition. These include the actual mayors of Pekalongan (Central Java) and Sibolga (North Sumatra), as well as the district mind of East Kutai (East Kalimantan) as well as Ogan Ilir (South Sumatra). Local election rules, which promote the dominance of incumbents, their families and well-funded politics candidates, are increasingly depriving Indonesian voters of a wider set of possible choices in local professional elections.
Holding simultaneous local elections in Indonesia was designed to promote better monetary efficiency and governance of local executive elections. But, it is unlikely to achieve these goals, and could potentially make matters much worse.
Simultaneous local elections won’capital t help Indonesian governance is republished along with permission from East Asian countries Forum