Can Beijing and Taipei Get Along?

The historic meeting in Singapore between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Taiwanese counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, on 7 The fall of was the first ever between the leaders of the two countries. Using the next Taiwanese presidential elections only two months aside, the meeting was observed by many observers as a last-minute try by the Chinese government to persuade the Taiwanese electorate that the judgment Kuomintang (KMT) remains the best choice for dealing with China.

However, one could also interpret it as being a recognition on behalf of China’utes leaders that domestic developments in Taiwan require the development of a brand new approach towards dealing with Taipei.

Beijing understands that the KMT is poised to get rid of the presidency and charge of the Legislative Yuan to the resistance Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the upcoming January 2016 election, in part due to Ma’s too China-friendly policies. At the end of October, the KMT dumped it’s candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu, due to the woman’s unpopular election campaign for even nearer ties with China.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), despite showering Taiwan along with economic gifts, has discovered that money cannot buy love. Despite preferential economic deals, trade increasing by more than 50 percent and mainland tourism in order to Taiwan increasing to 4 million visitors in 2014, it seems that attempts to woo Taiwan with economic benefits on your own remain unsuccessful. Instead, China-friendly policies are now associated with the KMT ‘getting as well close to China’ and the idea that they’ve ‘sold Taiwan to China’.

The CCP therefore must start preparing for a DPP management and cross-Strait relations post-January 2016. Beijing is interested in maintaining as many channels of communication with Taipei as possible as well as emphasising interdependence. Luckily, chances are high that under the leadership of Tsai Ingwen the actual DPP will be less driven by pro-independence ideology. One of her key campaign pledges has been to lessen the polarisation between the ‘Pan Green–Pan Blue’ divide. If elected, she is not likely to revert to the exact same pro-independence rhetoric of the 2000–2008 Chen Shui-bian administration that infuriated Beijing as well as alienated its security guarantor, Washington.

The need for the (informal) US protection guarantee provided by the Nineteen seventy nine Taiwan Relations Act far outweigh the costs of calling for unilateral self-reliance without Washington’s backing as well as risking a war along with China. As a result, while a DPP win would be a suboptimal outcome for Beijing, it would not automatically produce greater tensions across the Taiwan Strait as well as shut the door for selective cooperation. There is a distinct possibility that Beijing might still engage Taiwan within the context of the present ‘status quo’, its bellicose rhetoric in spite of.

The need for both sides to develop the cooperative approach under a DPP government is imperative due to crucial domestic attitude shifts both in Taiwan and China — dynamics that, left unaddressed, could make the delicate balancing act across the Strait more difficult to maintain over the next few years.

Tsai is aware that for any majority of Taiwanese voters — of which 43 % are now swing voters — the question of unification versus independence isn’t the most pressing issue. Much more important is fixing Taiwan’utes stagnating economy. And despite the unfavorable perception of close economic ties to China, good financial relations are critical to support the ailing Taiwanese economy.

Recent opinion forms show that a clear majority of Taiwanese people identify themselves as exclusively Taiwanese and support for marriage with the mainland is at an all-time low. In the future, given the democratic nature of Taiwan’s political system, any Taiwanese administration, as well as the CCP, will have to take this opposition in order to unification into consideration. Tsai’s response to the Xi–Ma meeting was therefore, measured, emphasising that any kind of development in cross-Strait relations had to follow democratic procedures and have the public’s assistance.

At the same time, for China the actual Taiwan issue remains one of nationwide prestige. It links towards the legitimacy of the CCP regime poor the ‘one China’ policy and also the ‘one country, two systems’ construction. In recent times, a more nationalistic public within mainland China has only additional pressure for the leadership to remain firm on Taiwan.

Until now, the CCP has always rejected the notion of meeting a leader associated with Taiwan, as this would imply recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Consequently, China needs to avoid the public notion that the CCP has become soft on Taiwan. Indeed, the CCTV broadcast of President Ma’s announcement of the meeting censored his Republic of China flag pin. At the meeting, Ma’s five-point proposal for the ‘peaceful development’ of cross-Strait relations was also prematurely cut off at the 4th point.

However, the Xi–Ma conference also reflected a gradual transfer of the CCP’s attitude in the direction of cross-Strait relations. Beijing is aware the United States is unlikely to abandon Taiwan and that Taiwan’s socio-political trends are not in its favour, making a unilateral move towards reunification extremely costly. Which implies the need to work pragmatically using the next government. In this feeling, the Xi–Ma meeting would be a watershed for China in its recognition of a new era in managing cross-Strait relations.

The Xi–Ma meeting indicators a new era in China–Taiwan relations is republished with permission through East Asia Forum