Buddhist Nationalism Changes Course in Myanmar

The upcoming general elections in Myanmar enhance the question of religion’s part in democratisation processes. Previously Buddhism continues to be an important force in favour of democracy, however in the 2015 election campaign powerful Buddhist forces are supporting the military-aligned Marriage Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This is their democratic right, but it might hinder further political changes and democratisation in Myanmar.

Buddhist nationalism has prospered since the introduction of political reforms in 2011. Leading Buddhist priests have formed the Organization for that Protection of Race as well as Religion, generally known by the abbreviation ‘MaBaTha’, which has the aim of marketing Buddhist interests. MaBaTha monks and nuns have been the driving force behind, among other things, four controversial laws made to ‘protect race and religion’. The aim of these laws is to safeguard Buddhist interests, but some women’s legal rights groups and religious unprivileged see them as extremely discriminatory.

In the present election campaign, MaBaTha monks possess lent their support to the governing party, the USDP, addressing the military regime. At the same time, MaBaTha has urged people to not vote for Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, on the grounds that it is allegedly too Muslim-friendly. The generals possess since the inception of the MaBaTha supported MaBaTha’s protectionist agenda. The election campaign is showing which Buddhism may legitimise authoritarian regimes if they are to be promoting Buddhist interests.

Demands for condition protection of Buddhism have broad appeal in Buddhist countries and may mobilise political support. Traditionally the relationship between the state and faith has been characterised by mutual dependence, and there is a strong sensation that it is the state’s task to safeguard Buddhism. In Thailand, the king has to be a Buddhist. In addition, in both Sri Lanka as well as Myanmar it would be unthinkable to have a head of state who was not a Buddhist. Consequently, religious affiliation adheres up political power.

The problem is the place of religious minorities within states with a Buddhist identity. In a number of countries in the region, a pattern is actually developing where Buddhism legitimises the judgment political power, while cultural and religious minorities go through systematic exclusion. This political culture has been evident during this year’s election campaign in Myanmar, in which 88 candidates — a lot of whom were Muslims — were ineligible to stand for election. If Buddhist politics players have contributed to the exclusion of religious minorities in the possibility of participating in democratic processes, Buddhism may be boosting authoritarian forces rather than adding to democratisation.

While the Buddha preached radical ideas about salvation and equality, to claim that the Buddha was a democrat would be to study history backwards. Ancient Indian native society had a hierarchical framework, and the Buddha did not challenge this particular structure directly. The prevailing concept is that of an ideal Buddhist king, expected to safeguard the monastic order via physical protection and materials benefit, and prevent its moral decay. The expectation from the sangha in turn is to offer ideological legitimacy to the state.

Many of the statements made by the MaBaTha in the 2015 political election campaign fit into this conventional pattern of state support of Buddhism, which finds resonance within the wider public. In fact, calls for the protection of Buddhism have shown on their own to be particularly well suited in order to electoral competition. The need to find a appropriate ideology to rally for has paved the way with regard to radical Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar.

Another key point in Buddhist political ideology is a official divide between the state and the monastic order. In Myanmar (and Thailand), Buddhist monks are deprived of their political rights. The reason for this is in accordance with traditional Buddhist thinking, there should be a formal separation between the monks and political power. It means the monks do not have the right to election, form political parties, are a symbol of election or sit in parliament. Myanmar’s half million monks potentially comprise a significant foundation of voters, and it is easy to believe that this rule was created by the generals in order to restrict the monks’ political activities.

Monastic disenfranchisement represents the political paradox. On the one hand, it points to the privileged status of Buddhism within the Myanmar state. However, it represents a particular violation of basic political legal rights of monks and nuns. However, this does not necessarily mean that priests feel deprived of their basic political rights or lack political influence. Many monks who fight for democracy think rather that their exclusion through formal political processes opens up new and more important opportunities for informal political impact, because they can preserve their religious authority precisely through not becoming ‘tarnished’ by celebration political activity.

Monks were main in mobilising opposition to the army junta in protests in 1988 and 2007. Many monks have also supported various student protests and signed requires constitutional amendments. There are also strong Buddhist traditions of moral responsibility, justice, equality and willingness to work voluntarily for a common purpose. Each one of these traditions are important for successful democratisation.

Buddhism may contribute to democratisation in Myanmar, as long as Buddhists make a stand for a new as well as inclusive Myanmar where ethnic as well as religious minorities receive protection and enjoy equal rights.

Are Myanmar’utes monks hindering democratisation? is republished with permission from East Asia Forum