India's Thorny Nuclear Policy

India’s Pakistan dilemma continues, as Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that they reserve the option of using nuclear weapons. The statement was made a week before Prime Minister Narendra Modi’utes meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in July 2015 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization summit at Ufa, Russia. But the meeting did little in order to abate either ceasefire violations across the borders or terrorism.

Pakistani nuclear weapons have over the years provided it with a shield that constrains Indian from using military means in response to acts of cross-border terrorism. Pakistan’s introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons or Tactical Atomic Weapons (TNWs) has lowered the threshold for nuclear conflict and has negated India’s conventional weaponry superiority.

Does New Delhi, then, have to review its nuclear doctrine to prevent misunderstanding or miscalculation in an ever-changing global and regional security environment?

The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) political election manifesto for the 2014 general election declared that they would review and, if required, update India’s nuclear policy. Then prime ministerial prospect Narendra Modi clarified that as far as he was concerned, he would opt for the ‘no first use’ policy as articulated by former pm Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

India’s own past record within responding to cross-border terrorism is mixed, regardless of whether in relation to the Mumbai attacks of 2008 or 1993. This raises questions about whether the politics class will have sufficient gumption to ensure retaliation for Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry policy.

The Indian public view their political leadership as weak-kneed and lacking the capability to respond. Any policy, conventional or even nuclear, depends on effective political leadership. Given the country’s democratic political system, the idea of revising India’s doctrine — to give the military a role associated with primacy in making such decisions due to a belief that the political management does not have the will to get back, could well be dangerous.

India’s army build-up in the face of threats from both sides has been significant over the last 10 years or so, with a quantum leap in military technology putting it way ahead of its neighbour Pakistan. Despite this, India has had little success so far within developing a comprehensive yet credible defence posture against the broad spectrum of threats it faces, both nuclear as well as conventional.

Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal and lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is a cause for worry. India’s nuclear weapons are designed to deter atomic threats and attacks. But it is not meant to act as a deterrent against conventional weapons or asymmetrical attacks.

Looking past Pakistan, India is also faced with growing Chinese military modernisation. China’s acquisition of certain weapons systems seems to indicate that their nuclear doctrine has gone beyond one of retaliation.

For example, The far east has made advancements in the growth and development of missiles: the recent DF-41 has a range of 12,000 kilometres, capable of delivering missiles via Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles. While it can be used defensively, it is primarily considered an offensive weapon program.

It must be noted that the financial allocation for non-proliferation in China’s defence budget has gone lower and the allocation for modernisation of nuclear weapons has gone up. While China’s ‘no very first use’ policy includes a pledge to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, India does not estimate this policy.

India’s conventional capabilities have significantly advanced through the years with the introduction of technically superior military hardware. However the political leadership’s disengagement from protection issues may have serious implications if they were to turn to a limited war strategy in a turmoil without having evaluated the risks. There’s a pressing need for India to develop and field a comprehensive range of options that satisfy India’s deterrence and proper needs. India must also review the command and control buildings of its strategic forces.

The not enough information on the progress made in modernising and operationalising India’s strategic assets offers resulted in an information vacuum which has led to speculation. The government needs to release more data upon its nuclear policy into the public domain to keep its citizens informed and to reduce any misunderstanding with neighbouring nuclear states about India’utes intent.

It’s time for India to rethink its nuclear policy is republished with permission from East Asia Forum