Japan Holds the Key to Regional Peace and Economic Cooperation

International scrutiny of Japan’s international policy direction and protection policy posture has been especially intense in recent months. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’utes 14 August statement around the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and security legislation passed on 19 September have brought renewed attention to the topic.

In the lead-up to Abe’s August statement, speculation was rife that relations between Asia and its Asian neighbours might further deteriorate over historic issues. Still, the Abe statement struck a balance that gained a favourable review from the Japanese public, satisfied their conservative political support foundation for the most part and avoided any kind of serious worsening of relationships with China and South Korea. Critically, Prime Minister Abe acknowledged as well as upheld the war apologies associated with previous Japanese governments and declared that this ‘position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future’.

While the Chinese and Southern Korean governments were not completely satisfied with the Abe statement, these people restrained their criticism. This leaves the door open for serious efforts to improve trilateral relations. On the sidelines of China’utes own World War II anniversary actions on 3 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping consulted with South Korea President Park Geun-hye regarding the possibility of reigniting trilateral Japan–China–ROK summits. All three countries need follow-up efforts to make this a reality.

At the same time frame, having clearly upheld past Japanese government war apologies, the time is right for Japan to shift its focus to the growth and development of proactive and forward searching diplomacy.

The passing of the recent security legislation has been criticised in some circles as an attempt by Japan to return to militarism or to establish itself as a so-called ‘normal nation’. The security bills somewhat loosen the self-imposed constraints upon Japan’s defence, carried out inside the framework of the Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Japanese Constitution.

The brand new legislation permits the Asia Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to use force with regards to collective self-defence only if ‘an equipped attack against a foreign country that’s in a close relationship with Japan occurs.’   Or, if the attack ‘threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear threat to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty as well as pursuit of happiness’, there are ‘no other suitable means available to repel the attack’, and the use of force is limited to ‘the minimum degree necessary’. The bills also expand the actual permissible scope of the SDF to provide rear-area logistical support to friendly nations, respond to ‘grey zone’ incursions into Japoneses territory short of an outright armed attack, and take part more effectively in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in line with international norms.

Japan’utes neighbours and future Japoneses governments should read the trigger for resorting to the exercise of collective self-defence as related exclusively to defensive objectives. Some of the government explanations within the Diet debates may have been deceptive.  The example of a demining mission in the Hormuz Strait that suggested which economic triggers would be allowable might especially be misleading. Japan is still highly restricted in terms of pursuing collective self-defence like a tool to achieve any political or economic agenda.

Practically speaking, the security bills open the door for SDF participation in joint contingency planning. The SDF may also now provide more substantial rear-area as well as logistical support to friendly militaries in case of a situation that would seriously influence Japan’s security. With regard to UN PKOs, excessive restrictions beyond worldwide and UN norms undermined past Japanese contributions. SDF soldiers were under the protection of troops from other nations, but they could not help defend individuals very soldiers who were safeguarding them. Bringing SDF participation in UN PKOs in line with UN norms will enable Japan in order to contribute more substantially to the peaceful enhancement of the international security environment.

Japan’s tranquil but low-profile foreign policy position over the last 70 years is a source of both praise and criticism. Japan has been commended for eschewing war but has also been disparaged for its passive chequebook diplomacy and the asymmetrical nature of its security dependence on the United States.

Given the ongoing structural changes in Asia, there is a need for Japan to take on a more proactive diplomatic approach to peace. The premise ought to be on the following five crucial principles.

First, Japan must directly face up to history. The basis for that Japanese government’s official acknowledgement of history continues to be the 1995 Murayama Statement, which included a good apology for Japan’s wartime transgressions, and the 1993 Kono Statement, which included a good apology for and recognition of the role of the Japanese military in forcibly recruiting some of the comfort women.

There is absolutely pointless to back away from these jobs in the future. Any statements or even actions by Japanese politics or social leaders which are seen as denying or downplaying this recognition of history will cast doubt on Japan’utes future intentions. History issues must not be allowed to impede the deepening of mutual trust in between Japan and its neighbours, nor disrupt the regional purchase amid the shifting stability of power.

Second, maintain a national commitment to peace. After it’s defeat in World War II, Japan transformed itself and it has taken care of a peaceful posture under Article 9. Under the new security legislation, Japan ought to still maintain this peaceful posture. While it can now participate more actively in worldwide security cooperation, Japan’s basic security outlook must still be rooted in a defensive approach that does not use military way to pursue economic or political agendas.

Third, Japan must offer its self-defence and enhance worldwide security. The two key support beams of Japan’s defence are the SDF and the US–Japan alliance. To ensure its security, Japan should continue to rely on the United States, and particularly its nuclear umbrella. The threshold for the United States to lean towards the use of force internationally is higher under the Obama administration. As a result, Japan should take on higher responsibility for its own defence and increase cooperation along with partners such as Australia, Indian, South Korea and ASEAN. It should additionally play a more active part in the peaceful enhancement of international security through the United nations PKOs and other means.

Fourth, Japan should advance democratic values. The fundamental elements of Japan’s democracy include not only elections, but also a respect for the rule of law, human rights and the principles of a market economy. Japan can’t and should not use military pressure to promote democracy. However, it can behave quietly behind the scenes, including through institutional capacity building, to assist developing countries in establishing the actual foundational elements of democratic society.

Lastly, Asia should pursue more energetic and strategic diplomacy. Future global economic growth and anticipating the waves will undoubtedly centre in East Asia. A rise in the military strength of countries around the region will accompany economic growth, ushering in a more multipolar landscape. Maintaining peace and order in the region amid this shifting stability of power will require innovative diplomacy to realise win–win situations for all countries under an inclusive regional order. Japan must create a proactive diplomatic strategy to further engage with the region and deepen cooperation through such means as the East Asia Summit, the actual Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Regional Extensive Economic Partnership and the suggested trilateral Japan–China–ROK FTA.

By adhering to these five principles, and especially by pursuing a more proactive and strategic approach to diplomacy in Asia, Japan may contribute to the creation of a more steady and peaceful regional order.

Proactive diplomacy for peace under Japan’s new security legislation is actually republished with permission from East Asia Forum