Have Myanmar Voters' Priorities Changed?

The last of the 2015 Myanmar election results have yet to be confirmed by the Marriage Election Commission.  However, it is clear that the National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a massive victory.

The NLD’s triumph is the more remarkable given that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had the advantages of incumbency, almost limitless resources and the explicit assistance of Buddhist nationalist groups like the Business for the Protection of Competition and Religion (MaBaTha). So what is in store for MaBaTha and similar groups moving forward?

An NLD victory does not represent a complete rejection of either MaBaTha or its narrative that Buddhism is under threat. Rather, it seems that the majority of voters’ desire for overall political alter ranked higher than their issues about religious issues, a minimum of for the moment.

Religious issues are likely to stay both important and divisive within the months to come. A triumphant NLD should tread cautiously as it formulates its policy ideas. The monk-led MaBaTha and its allies will still be able to influence Burmese politics as well as develop their largely anti-Muslim narrative. However, observers can expect the actual organisation, and the religious as well as political environments within so it operates, to change in substantial ways in 2016.

MaBaTha (and the 969 Motion that preceded it) effectively stepped into an institutional vacuum if this argued that Buddhism is threatened by from Islam. While other powerful Buddhist institutions are active in the country, they have mostly been engaged in religious and social welfare actions. MaBaTha quickly dominated the political space for discussing Buddhism in Myanmar. In a very short period, they made it difficult — even life threatening — to express another view on the protection of Buddhism.

That is slowly starting to change. Municipal society, interfaith, youth and other teams have organised community systems dedicated to resisting inter-religious violence. Residents of Mawlamyine were able to prevent several pre-election attacks from spiralling in to wider violence. In addition, voting in Meikhtila proceeded without incident, despite divisive religious campaigning there.

Prominent monks have started to speak out more strongly against anti-Muslim sentiment. In the week before the election, the influential monk Ashin Sandartika gave an interview that rejected the MaBaTha argument and asserted that Myanmar’s political transition required inter-religious understanding and cooperation.

MaBaTha offers benefited from being able to organise about a key issue: the four ‘Laws for the Protection of Competition and Religion’ that Myanmar’s parliament handed in stages in 2015. However, there have been signs of divergent priorities among the group’utes leadership and membership. Notable anti-Muslim monk U Wirathu has stated that he will continue to work in the political arena in order to ban Muslim dress and other customary practices. Other priests connected to MaBaTha have discussed an offer to give monks and nuns the vote, which would be very controversial in Myanmar as monks expect to remain separate from worldly concerns. A campaign against livestock slaughtering (for economic and Islamic spiritual purposes) also reportedly produced a dispute within the company. The popular Sitagu Sayadaw endorsed making Buddhism their state religion at the MaBaTha rally upon 4 October, another possibly controversial issue.

The political context in which MaBaTha operates will change following an NLD government assumes energy. Recent reports have provided further evidence that some in the USDP federal government have been supporting anti-Muslim sentiment as well as violence, as well as condoning and permitting extreme hate speech. Experts might reasonably expect an NLD government not to directly support anti-Muslim violence. However, the actions of the military and other security causes will remain out of the government’s control.

None of this is to say that MaBaTha is not a potent political force or even that an NLD victory ensures an end to anti-Muslim discrimination. Huge numbers attended MaBaTha rallies celebrating the passing of the four religious laws. This served as a testament to its appeal and, because leading MaBaTha monk U Parmaukkha said, ‘a warning for people who try to attack these laws’. As much as many outside Myanmar may hope that the NLD makes repealing the actual laws a priority, a direct attack on MaBaTha’s primary achievement would be one of the best ways to galvanise as well as refocus the group and its extensive network.

In addition, despite the large numbers of Muslims voting for the NLD, the party has not yet proven itself a highly effective defender of the rights of spiritual or ethnic minorities. Its Central Executive Committee declined to run a single Muslim candidate in the election (as did the USDP). The incoming NLD government should develop additional means to ensure that religious, ethnic, along with other minority groups have a immediate voice in governance.

It is also important to note that, while some within MaBaTha might be virulent ‘ultra-nationalists’, this label does not describe all of its supporters. Many primarily recommend its pro-Buddhist activities such as arranging ‘Buddhist Sunday Schools’. Creating space to build up an alternate platform of conditioning Buddhism that is not hostile to non-Buddhists might challenge MaBaTha’s monopoly and deteriorate some of its support.

The talk is also true: an endorsement from the NLD’s political project is not inconsistent with anti-Muslim attitudes or even discrimination against other religious, ethnic, or national groups. Those interested in advancing politics reform in Myanmar must ensure that the NLD does not succumb to pressure from groups like MaBaTha in order to anti-Muslim individuals in its own ranks or among its partners.

The NLD’s election win represented a number of things. It indicated that people wanted more change than the USDP government has provided. It signalled that most Burmese voters declined the politics of fear and hatred that many MaBaTha monks sought to sow.

However, the actual issues that facilitated MaBaTha’s fast rise still exist, exacerbated through prejudice amplified by many years of divide-and-rule policies and the uncertainties of the current transition. The NLD’s electoral triumph represents a great opportunity to entrench democracy within Myanmar, but discriminatory and exclusionary politics might still derail its prospects.

The post-election future of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar is republished along with permission from East Asia Forum