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Since President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office, he has been clear and constant in explaining his international policy priorities, enunciating the principle of putting ‘national interest’ first. Putting national interest first isn’t surprising in a leader’s foreign coverage. What has been notable is the way that Jokowi has defined ‘national interest’. Put simply, Indonesia’s policy has shifted from one based on values to one based on economics.

Jokowi’utes first speech on international affairs signalled the change in strategy, at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit within November 2014. While agreeing upon ASEAN’s importance, he stressed that ‘We have to make sure the national interest cannot be lost’. He restated the principle before visiting Singapore in July 2015, saying that ‘national interests would be the motivation for cooperation with other countries’.

This is a significant policy shift compared to his predecessor, former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY). Indonesia’s technique under SBY was to raise its international status by upholding values such as human legal rights and democracy, and by playing an energetic part in global government through institutions like the United Nations (UN). ASEAN was seen as a way of achieving greater leverage for Indonesia’s diplomacy. The economic aspect of national interest was very fragile in 2005.

In 2004–2005, when SBY began his first phrase, the Bush administration’s battle against terrorism was at its peak. The Bali bombings and Jemaah Islamiah’s activities showed that Indonesia also had a security problem. Along with security concerns dominating worldwide politics, preventing foreign politics or military intervention what food was in the top of Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda. Its strategy was to emphasise that it hadn’t been a country of extremists, but the nation of moderate as well as modern Muslims, and a successful democracy.

This had been why SBY projected its image in terms of values rather than the economic climate. In contrast, Jokowi came to office throughout a major economic power shift. He had to project a picture of Indonesia as a cautious economic player that would not really easily fall behind.

Three elements stand out when we examine the new foreign policy.

First is the Indonesian people’s frustration in the final years of the SBY administration. Unfortunately, towards the end of his presidency, SBY’s ‘million friends and zero enemies’ policy sounded more like an excuse to prevent taking responsibility to advance domestic demands than anything else.

Jokowi and the team were aware of these frustrations. It appeared the new president’s plan to overcome the shortcomings of his predecessor’s platform was to reveal the diplomatic dividend with the individuals. The easiest way to do that would be by sharing the economic benefits of trade, investment and employment.

The restrictions of value-based or ‘democracy’ diplomacy has been the second key factor in changing international policy. One milestone associated with SBY’s diplomacy was establishing the actual ASEAN Charter. This not only institutionalised the association and raised its trustworthiness but, with strong inspiration from Indonesia, ASEAN also embraced the idea of shared political ideals: human rights and democracy. Winning agreement from the politically diverse regular membership was a significant achievement.

Shared-value diplomacy additionally had a strategic purpose, for this was designed to create greater international leverage both by improving ASEAN’s strategic value and increasing Indonesia’s global status as the de facto leader.

However, the limits of value-based diplomacy became clear following the coup in Thailand in Might 2014, after the ASEAN charter had taken effect. As the charter prohibits buying of power by extra-constitutional indicates, the coup violated it’s principles.

SBY and then foreign reverend Marty Natalegawa demanded that Myanmar, the 2014 ASEAN chair, issue a statement criticising or indicating serious regret about the occasions in Thailand. However, unsurprisingly, Myanmar had been quick to acknowledge the Thai junta and the importance of the military’s need to intervene at times. Cambodia followed suit, acknowledging the actual junta because the monarchy endorsed it, the common source of legitimacy between the two countries.

Failure to condemn the Thai hen house weakened the charter as well as Indonesia’s diplomatic influence in making it. It showed the bounds of what Indonesia, despite to be the group’s de-facto leader, could hope to achieve through its diplomacy in ASEAN and through value-based diplomacy.

Third, the shift in the direction of a greater economic focus fits within the current administration’s broader views on global dynamics along with a shift in economic power to the actual East. As Jokowi’s thought of the regional and global order is fundamentally moored in economics, it was organic for him to see Indonesia’s national interest in the same terms. The aim is to ensure that Indonesia’s economy is in the winner’s circle as global dynamics alter. Looking forward, there is no hint which Jokowi’s foreign policy and it is economic focus will change.

Optimists and pessimists alike will agree this focus is good for Indonesia’s potential customers. Optimists consider that, with Indonesia’s demographic bonus, there is great potential for it to be the next Asian development engine. Emphasis on economic nationwide interest will therefore promise a gain in Indonesia’s worldwide political power. Pessimists will see Asia’s growth slowing and protectionism establishing. In this scenario, the government might gain credit for trying to secure Indonesia’s economic curiosity by crafting a friendly local and global environment.

The economic turn in foreign policy is more structural than based on management. Given how similar Jokowi as well as Prabowo Subianto’s comments were within pre-election debates on foreign policy, it seems likely that even when Prabowo had won the presidential political election, he would have defined ‘national interest’ in similar terms. Domestic economic benefits will continue to be electorally popular and critical in Indonesia as well as define what is and isn’t in the national interest. Consequently, it will continue to drive Indonesia’utes foreign policy — at least before the next turn.

Indonesia’s international policy takes an economic turn is republished with permission through East Asia Forum

The last of the 2015 Myanmar election results have yet to be confirmed by the Marriage Election Commission.  However, it is clear that the National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a massive victory.

The NLD’s triumph is the more remarkable given that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had the advantages of incumbency, almost limitless resources and the explicit assistance of Buddhist nationalist groups like the Business for the Protection of Competition and Religion (MaBaTha). So what is in store for MaBaTha and similar groups moving forward?

An NLD victory does not represent a complete rejection of either MaBaTha or its narrative that Buddhism is under threat. Rather, it seems that the majority of voters’ desire for overall political alter ranked higher than their issues about religious issues, a minimum of for the moment.

Religious issues are likely to stay both important and divisive within the months to come. A triumphant NLD should tread cautiously as it formulates its policy ideas. The monk-led MaBaTha and its allies will still be able to influence Burmese politics as well as develop their largely anti-Muslim narrative. However, observers can expect the actual organisation, and the religious as well as political environments within so it operates, to change in substantial ways in 2016.

MaBaTha (and the 969 Motion that preceded it) effectively stepped into an institutional vacuum if this argued that Buddhism is threatened by from Islam. While other powerful Buddhist institutions are active in the country, they have mostly been engaged in religious and social welfare actions. MaBaTha quickly dominated the political space for discussing Buddhism in Myanmar. In a very short period, they made it difficult — even life threatening — to express another view on the protection of Buddhism.

That is slowly starting to change. Municipal society, interfaith, youth and other teams have organised community systems dedicated to resisting inter-religious violence. Residents of Mawlamyine were able to prevent several pre-election attacks from spiralling in to wider violence. In addition, voting in Meikhtila proceeded without incident, despite divisive religious campaigning there.

Prominent monks have started to speak out more strongly against anti-Muslim sentiment. In the week before the election, the influential monk Ashin Sandartika gave an interview that rejected the MaBaTha argument and asserted that Myanmar’s political transition required inter-religious understanding and cooperation.

MaBaTha offers benefited from being able to organise about a key issue: the four ‘Laws for the Protection of Competition and Religion’ that Myanmar’s parliament handed in stages in 2015. However, there have been signs of divergent priorities among the group’utes leadership and membership. Notable anti-Muslim monk U Wirathu has stated that he will continue to work in the political arena in order to ban Muslim dress and other customary practices. Other priests connected to MaBaTha have discussed an offer to give monks and nuns the vote, which would be very controversial in Myanmar as monks expect to remain separate from worldly concerns. A campaign against livestock slaughtering (for economic and Islamic spiritual purposes) also reportedly produced a dispute within the company. The popular Sitagu Sayadaw endorsed making Buddhism their state religion at the MaBaTha rally upon 4 October, another possibly controversial issue.

The political context in which MaBaTha operates will change following an NLD government assumes energy. Recent reports have provided further evidence that some in the USDP federal government have been supporting anti-Muslim sentiment as well as violence, as well as condoning and permitting extreme hate speech. Experts might reasonably expect an NLD government not to directly support anti-Muslim violence. However, the actions of the military and other security causes will remain out of the government’s control.

None of this is to say that MaBaTha is not a potent political force or even that an NLD victory ensures an end to anti-Muslim discrimination. Huge numbers attended MaBaTha rallies celebrating the passing of the four religious laws. This served as a testament to its appeal and, because leading MaBaTha monk U Parmaukkha said, ‘a warning for people who try to attack these laws’. As much as many outside Myanmar may hope that the NLD makes repealing the actual laws a priority, a direct attack on MaBaTha’s primary achievement would be one of the best ways to galvanise as well as refocus the group and its extensive network.

In addition, despite the large numbers of Muslims voting for the NLD, the party has not yet proven itself a highly effective defender of the rights of spiritual or ethnic minorities. Its Central Executive Committee declined to run a single Muslim candidate in the election (as did the USDP). The incoming NLD government should develop additional means to ensure that religious, ethnic, along with other minority groups have a immediate voice in governance.

It is also important to note that, while some within MaBaTha might be virulent ‘ultra-nationalists’, this label does not describe all of its supporters. Many primarily recommend its pro-Buddhist activities such as arranging ‘Buddhist Sunday Schools’. Creating space to build up an alternate platform of conditioning Buddhism that is not hostile to non-Buddhists might challenge MaBaTha’s monopoly and deteriorate some of its support.

The talk is also true: an endorsement from the NLD’s political project is not inconsistent with anti-Muslim attitudes or even discrimination against other religious, ethnic, or national groups. Those interested in advancing politics reform in Myanmar must ensure that the NLD does not succumb to pressure from groups like MaBaTha in order to anti-Muslim individuals in its own ranks or among its partners.

The NLD’s election win represented a number of things. It indicated that people wanted more change than the USDP government has provided. It signalled that most Burmese voters declined the politics of fear and hatred that many MaBaTha monks sought to sow.

However, the actual issues that facilitated MaBaTha’s fast rise still exist, exacerbated through prejudice amplified by many years of divide-and-rule policies and the uncertainties of the current transition. The NLD’s electoral triumph represents a great opportunity to entrench democracy within Myanmar, but discriminatory and exclusionary politics might still derail its prospects.

The post-election future of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar is republished along with permission from East Asia Forum

Canada reported its monthly Gross domestic product estimate for September, and at the same time, provided its first estimate of Q3 GDP.   The truly amazing Graphic, created on Bloomberg, exhibits both time series.

The yellow line depicts the monthly GDP and the quarterly estimation is the white line.  Obviously, they track each other, as one would expected.  The good news is that after contracting in the first two quarters of the year, the Canadian economic climate expanded by 2.3% within Q3.

The bad news is that the growth was front-loaded, and as the quarter progressed, it lost much of its impetus.  The 0.5% contraction within September was the largest monthly decline since early ’09. 

The monthly GDP fell for that first five months of the season.  It bounced back in 06, expanding by 0.4% and largely maintained its mojo in July by growing 0.3%.  However, the economy slowed down to 0.1% in August before the September decline.  There isn’t any positive momentum at the start of Q4.

Since July, interest rate expectations in Canada, as reflected by the June 16 BA futures have generally faded. After cutting rates twice in the first part of the year, the Bank of North america signaled that the mini-easing cycle was more than.

The lower graph here exhibits the June 16 BA commodity.  They are flirting with the downtrend collection, which comes in near 99.20 today.  It is not reasonable to expect the Bank of Canada to cut rates at tomorrow's meeting.  However, a dovish declaration could fan rate cut expectations, which would lift the actual BA futures and weigh around the Canadian dollar.  Friday's work report for the US as well as Canada will likely underscore the actual divergence between the two economies.

Great Graphic: Canada Growth and Rate Anticipations is republished with permission through Marc to Market

Scotland will receive major new financial powers from the Scotland Bill working its way through Westminster. Holyrood will get more control over income tax, a few welfare powers, and will be assigned half of VAT receipts – all of the result of the Smith Commission agreement by the five leading Scottish political parties that followed the independence referendum that saw Scottish vote to remain in the UK.

A key element of the bill is the financial framework, which will set out how the new fiscal powers will function. One crucial part is how the transferred forces and benefits will modify the block grant, which the Scottish parliament gets from London. The Cruz Commission agreement was obvious that this grant should continue to be calculated using the Barnett formula, which allocates funding to the devolved nations from the UK according to their populace size.

The block-grant determination should fulfill two “no-detriment” principles that were additionally part of the agreement. First, there should be “no detriment [to Scotland or the UK] in the decision to devolve” additional forces. Second, there should be “no hindrance [to Scotland or the UK] from subsequent coverage decisions of the other government”.

Adjusting the block grant in a way that fulfills these principles is difficult. The very first principle suggests that the devolution of recent powers should not disadvantage Scotland – meaning it has to encourage the Scottish parliament to grow it’s tax base, for instance. In other words, Holyrood should gain funding if Scotland grows its tax take faster than the rest of the United kingdom, and lose funding whether it falls behind.

The second no-detriment theory suggests that if the UK or even Scottish governments alter any income taxes this should not have knock-on consequences for the other jurisdiction: a difficult challenge given that any spending or tax decisions will impact on other areas of spend and income.

The adjustment debate

It’s all take  Alex Oakenman

How best to adjust the give is still up for dialogue. I recently suggested we should use a method called per capita indexed deduction. This would encourage the Scottish parliament to grow its tax foundation without exposing Scotland to the danger that its tax take falls behind because its human population is growing more slowly than the rest of the UK. This is exactly what the Office for National Statistics (ONS) is currently forecasting.

If the grant rather is adjusted using one from the other two options on the actual table – levels deduction as well as indexed deduction – Scotland would have much less protection. In the case of levels deductions this happens because the block give links to a population share of changes in UK taxes, which is less than per household receipts in Scotland. Hence, the block grant adjustment removes more from the budget compared to is being added back in devolved income taxes.

The graph below shows how each method could affect Scotland’s prevent grant. It assumes that Scotland matches the rest of the UK’s financial performance and that populations grow in line with current ONS forecasts. In this scenario, Scotland would shed approximately £7bn from its block give at 2017-18 prices in the very first 10 years of the new forces if the levels deduction method were used; or almost half that if it used indexed deduction.

Anton Muscatelli

The reason to adopt per household indexed deduction should be that Scotland doesn’t have the powers to control its net migration. It would be unjust to expose it to dangers managed by the UK government, especially as UK demographic trends are so dominated by London and Southeast England.

One typical counter-argument is that the method would be unfair to taxpayers in the rest of the UK and would therefore violate the second no-detriment principle. For instance, suppose the UK government wanted to increase spending in an region like health, devolved in Scotland, and they funded this entirely by increasing income tax south of the border.

Using the method, Scotland’s grant would rise even though Scottish citizens were not paying for any of this. This is because the method would cut the Scottish block grant through less than the increase it obtained at the same time under the existing “Barnett consequentials” guidelines that determine how devolved nations' grants are affected by budget changes in London.

However, the 2nd no-detriment principle is almost impossible to fulfill. It would sometimes be violated despite the other adjustment methods, due to complex interactions between United kingdom government actions on reserved and devolved taxes and citizen behaviour.

Suppose for instance, the UK federal government was to fund a cut in a reserved tax such as corporation tax by raising the rate of income tax south of the border. The Scottish prevent grant would shrink below all three adjustment methods, reducing the Scottish government’s spending power – unless of course one measures and offsets the consequences of each action separately.

Furthermore, although the per-capita indexation method doesn’t address the 2nd no-detriment principle fully, it will get close to doing so. It does not induce a systematic gain in the Scottish budget (Scotland would lose in the above health-spending example if the reverse occurred and the UK government ended up being to cut income taxes and wellness spending).

Making the new system viable

There are other issues to deal with in the fiscal framework, not least the credit powers, which the Scottish parliament should have to smooth tax revenues and fund capital spending. There are also issues around how Scotland’utes share of VAT income will be estimated; how the preliminary adjustment in the first year from the new powers should be created; and how the block give should be adjusted in response to the additional welfare powers – would you use a similar method when it comes to tax powers, or a various one?

Getting the fiscal framework right is as important as the actual Scotland Bill itself. If we get it wrong, it could seriously penalise the Scottish parliament’s budget and cause main political acrimony between Scotland and the UK. It would undermine the spirit of the Smith Commission agreement, which aimed to make Scotland much more fiscally accountable without causing it any detriment.

Two tribes?  Marina Bolsunova

In addition, even once the new regime is up as well as running, there will be issues around how to carry it out in practice. In my view, the UK and Scottish governments ought to hand the power to settle disputes to an independent fiscal arbitrator. It is critical that the Scotland Bill and fiscal framework are to work fairly for both sides.

The Treasury must not be both a participant and arbiter. There’s already a tradition of impartial fiscal scrutiny in Scotland and also the UK through the Scottish Fiscal Commission and the Office for Spending budget Responsibility (OBR). Appointing an independent arbitrator might lay the foundations for a much more federal system of financial governance in the UK, which would help the whole country.

Scotland’s new powers must be well designed to make sure they are fair is republished along with permission from The Conversation

Africa did not achieve many of the Century Development Goals. This was due to the fact of poor governance and also the inability of many governments to stimulate sustainable development.

The Environmentally friendly Development Goals give the continent a new opportunity to achieve a new set of objectives. These include stimulating equitable growth, protecting environmental surroundings, and delivering quality affordable and reliable infrastructure.

Contrary to the prevailing trend in Africa, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari’s government seems keen to focus on these goals. During the adoption of the new goals at the United Nations, he explained they offered an opportunity to deal with unfinished business.

Buhari urged fellow member states to continue the fight to finish poverty and to deal with new threats to peace. He committed Nigeria to combating issues detrimental to the economy as well as ecosystems created by the demand for oil. He said:

In Nigeria, we have seen extreme weather variations, rising ocean levels, encroaching desertification, excessive rainfall, erosion and floods, land degradation. All threaten the ecosystem. These developments have disastrous human costs and they are affecting food security, livelihoods and the very survival of our people.

To address this we have developed a national policy to guide Nigeria’s reaction to climate change. Our response is extensively based on the twin strategy of minimization and adaptation.

Why sustainability matters

Sustainability has turned into a new mantra – a viewpoint of sorts.

The broad look at sustainability emphasises the need to balance ecological, social and economic factors.

There is a direct link to searching for sustainable development. This is a improvement, which does not disadvantage future generations. In addition, it recognises the actual nested interdependency between the economy, society and the environment.

In other words, the economy’s success is dependent on society’utes viability. In addition, society’s achievement links to the environment’s viability. This is very much at the heart of the new goals.

The emergence of sustainability in Nigeria’s politics discourse is a welcome rise in a number of ways. First, Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa. The main focus therefore gives a degree of authenticity and importance to the durability movement in Africa.

Second, it sets the Nigerian economy and society on the new path, which until recently has either been ignored, or not mainstreamed. It offers a new mental space to rethink economic growth and social development. In practical terms, this means considering issues of sustainability in government policies and choices.

Exactly how to embed sustainability factors, is still up for discussion. This requires further exploration and consideration given the composition associated with Buhari’s government and the ministerial investment portfolios.

Energy and infrastructure sector

By merging the ability, housing and works ministries, the federal government can take a different approach and push a broader durability agenda.

Ongoing reforms in the energy sector offer an opportunity to add sustainability thinking and practices by ensuring players abide by best practice. This shouldn’t be missed.

The first concern is to rethink Nigeria’s power mix in a way that meets longer-term goals. At the moment, it stands at approximately 75% gas and 25% hydro. The government can provide incentives and create an enabling environment for change.

Incentives might include corporate tax breaks as well as increased research and development investment in energy and facilities. The aim would be to encourage companies to explore opportunities in alternative energy, clean technologies and non-urban electrification.

There is also the opportunity to inform and influence housing projects. 1 innovative approach would be via encouraging the development of eco-friendly and affordable housing.

Another critical ministry is transport. Traffic menace is one of the main problems confronting many metropolitan areas in Africa. This is particularly true in Lagos, Nigeria’s economic funds. A significant amount of productive time sheds daily to traffic in the city.

Poor transport infrastructure is not good for business and the economic climate. The new goals emphasise the need for quality, reliable and tough infrastructure. This includes regional and transborder infrastructure to support development having a focus on affordable and equitable access.

The ministry of transportation is within good stead to key in to this trend. It should open up opportunities for the private sector to provide transport that meets financial, social and environmental demands. This could happen through public-private partnerships under an effective and pragmatic regulatory framework.

Petroleum and minerals

The ministries associated with petroleum resources and strong minerals also offer interesting possibilities. These two sectors are at the actual core of the extractive industry, which is fraught with sustainability challenges. These range from environmental degradation to community unrest.

Although the sector seems to be ahead of the others within adopting sustainability practices, more needs to be done. This could be achieved through effective regulation, enforcement and monitoring.

These ministries need innovative collaboration to avoid the danger of silo thinking. This is a real risk. One possibility is to have the co-ordinating responsibility of managing collaboration domiciled in the Vice President’s office.

Support for this office could be by:

* the Ministry of Environment given the pivotal importance of environmental sustainability; and

* the Office associated with Budgeting and National Planning, given the importance of embedding social, financial, and environmental considerations within national policies.

Beyond the ministerial portfolios, there is also room for regulating agencies to play a role.

How Nigeria is capable of growth that’s more fair and eco-friendly is republished with permission from The Conversation

Since Kim Jong-un inherited the throne from his father in 2011, there’s been widespread debate over the chance of North Korean economic reform. A 2015 report on the North Japanese economy pointed to domestic markets expanding in size and quantity, despite periods of government suppression. Black markets possess long existed in Northern Korea, but the growth of formal markets signals progressive changes in the North Korean economy. Just how far can these markets go?

In the past, North South korea has attempted to exercise small-scale reforms in order to make up for the loss of national income due to the fall of the Soviet Bloc as well as increasing international sanctions. In 1991, it established the Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) — based on the Chinese change structure — as a means to promote economic development through foreign investments.

The Kim Jong-il government began experimenting with economic liberalisation by permitting the development of unofficial markets in Two thousand and two. In July of the same 12 months, the regime launched its Economic Management Improvement Measures, which increased the independence of entrepreneurs and farmers. The Kim Jong-un administration enhanced this in 2013.

At a peek, these reforms represent the harbinger for economic transformations in North Korea. There are many forecasts that North Korea will soon follow China and Vietnam’utes lead. However, these small-scale changes do not yield a comprehensive image of North Korea. The alterations have been temporary and inadequate. It is essential to look beyond financial reforms, not only to understand Pyongyang’s incentives behind such adjustments, but also to examine the impact of monetary liberalisation on regime survival.

During the 1990s, the North Korean distribution system collapsed, paving the way in which for the formation of nationwide underground markets. These marketplaces soon replaced the government’utes role of supporting the people and became the backbone of the unofficial economy. Some 60 per cent of the population earned their residing from underground trade as well as 80 per cent of household income originates from black marketplaces.

Although the government continuously denies the presence of a market economy, it widely engages with private businesses. It leases spaces within markets, levies heavy taxes on merchants and dictates the type and number of goods that can be sold. These rules are to provide party cadres having a stable income and to strengthen the regime’s control over the unofficial economy. In this context, federal government reforms only serve as a validation for government interference through legalising existing economic institutions.

While permitting small-scale restructuring to take place, the government obviously marks a line between economic reform and celebration survival. It understands that marketplaces grow disproportionately to its own power. Liberalisation would involve the government reducing travel restrictions, tolerating higher freedom in information flows and allowing foreign firms to exert influence on household politics.

The basis for the legitimacy of the North Korean regime may be the people’s belief in the righteousness from the Communist revolution and the Kim dynasty’utes cult of personality. As such, outside information about how North South korea could be prosperous and democratic under an alternate political system would shake such beliefs for their cores.

The impact of Détente on Communist bloc politics and society also makes Pyongyang more hesitant to pursue an open economic policy using the outside world for fear of politics oppositions. This is because Détente stoked domestic resistance and civil rights protests in the Soviet Union, which North Korea wants to avoid. Growing contacts between North South korea and its trade partners (particularly South Korea) may encourage civil society to demand more independence and political reform. This might put the regime’s survival within serious danger.

More importantly, an abrupt change in economic situation may affect the distribution of power inside the party system. Since Ellie Jong-il’s death, the ‘moderate’ faction, which favours economic openness, and the ‘hardline’ faction, led by the Organisation and Guidance Department and the army divides the party. The actual hardline faction seeks to maintain the ‘army first’ policy by continuing atomic weapons development. Economic liberalisation may shift the balance of power against the hardliners, which could put Kim Jong-un’s position at risk.

The regime prefers political stability and unity to economic changes. Pyongyang will not pursue any large-scale changes, as economic liberalisation would likely undermine the stability of the regime.

In the actual meantime, it is likely that the Northern Korean regime will keep on walking a thin line between collapse and revolution by turning a blind eye to markets — as long as they don’t pose serious threats to the survival. The government will endure some degree of market independence that can safeguard national balance and provide party cadres with enough bribes to remain loyal to Pyongyang.

One should interpret indications of changes in the market system because the regime attitude towards private businesses. It is also an indication of the present balance of power between your moderate and hardline factions within the party. Still, no matter how little these changes are, these people shed some light upon life in the Hermit Kingdom. Northern Korean watchers must patiently continue following these changes for future analysis.

Will North Korea embrace market change? is republished with permission through East Asia Forum